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This paper explores different factors associated with the apparent urban concentration of
terrorist attacks in Egypt (outside Sinai) since July 2013. The effect of socio-economic
variables such as unemployment and poverty on terrorism are assessed in addition to
other variables like multitude of targets, logistical considerations, and Islamist support
base. Using data collected from local media sources, the results presented in this paper
show that support for Islamist parties correlates positively with the number of terrorist
attacks. Socio-economic factors like poverty and overall unemployment rate appear to
have little explanatory value. The results also suggest that the urban-rural divide in the
terrorism literature should not be taken at its face value but rather should be adapted to
fit the local context.
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Introduction
It was 2:30 pm on November 28, 2014 when the young man from Shubra took
his motorcycle, and drove to the 6th of October Bridge, just above the busy Abdel
Moneim Riad Square a few meters from Tahrir Square. The Muslim Brotherhood had
called for a day of protest and an uprising of Muslim youth on that day but the 25 year
old Mohamed Amer had other plans: he took a plastic bag laden with explosives, and
threw it onto the bustling square below. The young worker was apprehended on his
motorcycle only seconds after his homemade bomb exploded without causing any
injuries to the passersby below. Three other explosions hit Cairo that same day: two
also caused no casualties and remained unclaimed, while the other killed 2 security
personnel and was claimed by a group affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) (Abdul
Hamid: 2014, Yehia & El-Dayasti: 2014, Shehta: 2014).
This kind of attack was hardly an anomaly. Ever since the Muslim Brotherhood’s
deposal in June 2013, Egypt has witnessed an unprecedented rise in terrorist attacks
across the country. While the insurgency in Sinai garners the most media attention, in
simple numbers, the 6 urban governorates of the Nile Basin have the highest
concentration of attacks, 43%, despite the fact the urban population in these cities
represent only 27% of the total population. In terms of present scholarship on terrorism,
the concentration of attacks in urban areas is expected. However, it is a new pattern for
Egypt. During the wave of terrorism in the 1990s, most attacks were in the rural areas of
Upper Egypt where support for Al-Jama’a al Islamiya and Islamic Jihad were higher. In
addition, attacks during that period often targeted civilians and tourists. On the other
hand, most terrorist attacks outside of Sinai are low scale, unclaimed attacks that cause
4

few casualties like the attempt by Mohamed Amer to drop a bomb from the 6th of
October Bridge.
In this paper, I attempt to explain the reasons behind this apparent shift, and the
over-representation of attacks in urban governorates. There are many possible
explanations that urban areas would see the highest number of attacks; including
urbanization, better logistical sustenance, higher media presence, higher concentration
of government targets, more youth unemployment, including more unemployment of
educated youth, or that the Muslim Brotherhood which enjoys a high degree of rural
support choose to target urban governorates with less Islamist concentrations.
To address these questions I collected data on all terrorist attacks that occurred in
Egypt from July 2013 till July 2015. 1 These were then supplemented with data on voting
patterns, socioeconomic figures, including poverty and unemployment as well as
distance from the capital.

Client
My client in this case would be the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP)
and the Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS). Both entities have committed
large efforts in researching terrorism in Egypt. The former has its own security watch
documenting cases of terrorism attacks, reporting on terrorist organizations and
analyzing the general security situation in Egypt. The latter have also published their
own Cairo Index, reviewing and analyzing terrorist attacks post June 2013. Attempting
to bridge theory and practice, this paper could prove of great value both for the
Some general trends are publically available on this issue through the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
(TIMEP) but the data itself is not available. Therefore, I had to go through with the process of data collection.
Details pertaining to this process are available in the Methods section of this paper.

1
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academic literature as well as to those endeavoring to develop practical counterterrorism policies. This paper will build on the research conducted by both these
organizations, and add additional support to their initial conclusions regarding trends
and sources of terrorism in Egypt since June 2013.

Background
According to the most recent quarterly report issued by the Tahrir Institute’s
“Security Watch,” Egypt has been facing an intense wave of terrorist attacks since the
deposal of Mohammad Morsi in June 2013. Starting with a massive spike in incidents in
the Northern Sinai, in July 2013, there were approximately 30 attacks per month in
2013, and 2014, and 90 attacks per month in 2015 (TIMEP, May 2016). For much of the
36-month period, two thirds of all attacks were concentrated in Northern Sinai. However,
starting in the fall 2014, there was a marked up-tick in the number of attacks across the
canal. During the period from January 2015 through August 2015 attacks reached an
average of 3 per day, with nearly three quarters taking place outside of Sinai and across
the different governorates of the Nile Basin (TIMEP, February 2016). While the city of
Cairo saw the highest number of attacks overall, charts presented by Security watch
show some interesting patterns. First, during the months of March, April, May, June and
July of 2015, attacks appeared to be concentrated in Faiyoum, a largely rural and
economically pressured governorate, which is also a stronghold of the Muslim
Brotherhood (TIMEP, May 2016).
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The apparent trends suggested by the figures included in the Tahrir Institute’s
“Security Watch” reports raises some interesting questions with regards to the existing
theories of terrorism and for past patterns in Egypt. While the concentration of attacks in
the capital city is consistent with terror campaigns carried out in other nationalist
conflicts, it is different from the campaign waged by Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyah in the
1990s. In addition, the apparent concentration of attacks in governorates associated
with the Muslim Brotherhood lends support to the government’s charge that this group is
behind the attacks. As the next section will discuss, while it is probable for attacks to be
concentrated in the capital city, the high numbers in locations associated with the
Muslim’s Brotherhood’s support base is surprising.

Literature Review
Earlier geographic dispersion studies have already established urban cities are
more likely to be targeted by terrorism than rural ones. Several studies have tried to
distill the reasons both from a qualitative and subsequently using quantitative methods.
Qualitatively, Crenshaw (1981) has argued that modernization and urbanization are two
permissive factors that set the stage for terrorism on the long run rather than being
direct precipitants of terrorism. Urban and modern cities have better networks of
transportation and communications that offer mobility and publicity for terrorists.
They also have a high number of accessible targets and methods.
Grabosky (1979) has mentioned other factors that help explain why terrorism is more
likely to occur in urban cities. Similar to Crenshaw, he mentions communication,
mobility, and multitude of targets. He also includes audiences, chances of more media
7

attention, anonymity, easier recruitment, and easier acquisition of logistics and
funds. Crucially, he also mentions the concentration of young middle-class intellectuals
in cities, who in the end represent the rank and files of terrorist organizations. More
recently, Krueger (2008) has also concluded that it is mainly well-educated, middleclass or individuals from high-income families that end up being drawn to terrorism. He
then rules out the idea of a causal relation between poverty and terrorism, pointing
rather to the suppression of rights, liberties, and the curtailment of non-violent means of
protest.
Indeed, the most notorious terrorists are well educated and come from well-to do
families. Al-Qaeda’s former leader, Osama Bin Laden is a clear example as are the 9/11
perpetrators but there are others such as PFLPs Wadi Haddad and George Habbash.
Other less notable cases include those arrested for a failed attack on Glasgow Airport,
which included six doctors and medical students and a doctorate holder of design and
technology (Hoffman, 2010). In their study, Bergan and Pandey show that out of 79
terrorists responsible for terrorist attacks between 1993 and 2005, 53% had attended a
college or received a college degree with engineering and medicine being the most
favorite subjects (Bergen and Pandey 2006). Similarly, Gambetta and Hertog (2016)
find a ‘curious connection’ between Islamist radicalism and engineering schools. Ayman
Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s right hand, is also said to have boasted about the high success
they had in recruiting from Cairo’s elite faculties; engineering and medicine (Wright,
2006). Another study reviewing 33 of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders includes 12 with
an engineering background and 10 with a medical one (Trager et al., 2012).
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Following Crenshaw’s example, Ian Ross (1993) divides the causes of terrorism
into permissive and precipitant ones. He places the geographical location (i.e.
urbanization) and level of modernization under the former and organizational
development/split and support under the latter. While organizational splits could reduce
the overall effective power of a terrorist group, in other cases it creates more terrorism
and more support from the aggrieved population. The current internal rift inside the
Muslim Brotherhood did indeed result in a debate over the use of violence with younger
members being more inclined to support violent means while older members are
concerned with the long term consequences this could mean to the organization. This
led to an open confrontation between both sides beginning with an attempt to
accommodate the youth and ended with a purge and recontrol by the old guard all the
while terrorist attacks were ongoing.
The level of support is also a facilitator of terrorism. It makes it easier to get donations,
weapons, and sanctuary to terrorist organizations. While it is intuitive that the level of
support directly impacts terrorism, there is one caveat related to target selection.
According to De La Calle & Sanchez Cuenca (2006), terrorists are constrained in their
attacks by their supporters’ ideological preferences. Seeking to sustain this support,
terrorists will avoid indiscriminate killings if their support base is sensitive to civilian
casualties. This means that terrorists will take measures to avoid attacking or harming
their own support base. This also means that while high levels of support could facilitate
financing terrorist activities, these incidents seldom cause harm to the support base
itself. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has well rooted support in rural areas more than
in urban ones. While these poorer and underserved governorates apparently suffer less
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from terrorist attacks they were the main strongholds of the Islamist organization. The
Muslim Brotherhood was able to get their highest percentages of vote in rural
governorates, especially in Upper Egypt, where they have invested much resources in
societal programs over the years.
The infamous greed and grievance debate presented by Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) is also of relevance despite its focus on the issue of civil wars. They conclude
that opportunity or greed is the indicator of civil wars rather than grievances. The main
factor in this sense is the availability of finance. This includes easily lootable resources
such as primary commodity exports. The determinants of grievances, according to
Collier and Hoeffler, are ethnic religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion,
and economic inequality. In their model, inequality does not have an effect on rebellion.
Thus they see little proof that rebellion is a protest against low income. In addition to
inequality as a grievance, they add that political rights, ethnic polarization, and even
religious fractionalization have little effect on rebellion. Only ethnic dominance is seen
as a grievance with an adverse effect on rebellion. Despite their different focus (civil war
vs. terrorism), this runs in contrast to Krueger’s emphasis on the suppression of rights
and liberties, a more grievance based approach.
The confusion between civil wars and terrorism is not only because of the grey area
between them but also because both concepts partially overlap with the urban-rural
divide. No region offers a strike example between such an overlap as does Latin
America. The foco (focus) theory manifested by Regis Debry on behalf of Che Guevara
and his experience in Cuba was more inclined towards a rural form of guerrilla warfare.
However, in more urbanized Latin American countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
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Uruguay rural foco was abandoned and replaced by an urban foco. This was largely
influenced by a man called Carlos Marighella, the leader of the Ação Libertadora
Nacional, a Brazilian terrorist organization operating mainly in Rio de Janeiro and Sao
Paolo (UMD, 2010). In 1970, Marighella wrote his influential Minimanual of Urban
Guerrilla. While the name of his manual contributes to the confusion between guerrilla
warfare and terrorism, ALN operations amounted to nothing less than outright terrorism.
This ranged from kidnappings and hijacking to bank robberies. In fact, Marighella
himself took pride and honor in being called a terrorist.
While Boot (2013) mentions that rural guerrillas have the ability to stay alive for decades
due mainly to the effects of the social services they provide, he goes on to say that
“terrorism is the tactic of last resort for those too weak to create guerrilla forces”.
Looking at this from the contrast between Guevara’s rural foco and its success in Cuba
compared with Marrighella’s urban foco and its reliance on terrorist tactics, one can
assume why terrorists, who are naturally weaker than guerrillas, are more likely to target
urban cities.
Today, one organization that suffers from an internal urban-rural divide in Egypt is none
other than the Muslim Brotherhood.

The organization is also suffering from raging

internal debate over the use of violence and has been directly accused by the
government of standing behind the terrorist attacks. Crucially, one of the reasons why
the Muslim Brotherhood is still able to sustain itself is its entrenchment in rural areas
especially in Upper Egypt.

11

An Urban Rural Divide in the Muslim Brotherhood
The sudden surge in the number of terrorist attacks after the Muslim
Brotherhood’s deposal in June 2013 put the Muslim Brotherhood under the spotlight.
Coincidentally, while there is an apparent urban-rural difference in terrorist attacks there
is also a deep structural urban-rural divide inside the Muslim Brotherhood. The general
socio-economic diversity across Egypt meant that the brotherhood itself had to deal with
similar internal discrepancies between its members.
On the one hand there was “the wealthier, more cosmopolitan urban Brotherhood
bourgeoisie” and on the other were “the group’s much more culturally and socially
conservative, lower-middle-class and lower-class grass roots based in rural areas and
small towns” (El-Sherif, 2014). The urban elite historically controlled the decision
making powers inside the organization resisting the promotion of rural middle class
members. In his series on political Islam in Egypt, El-Sherif (2014) mentions that despite
this “many of these urban businessmen and professionals retained a conservative
religious flair, creating internal friction and more complex cleavages beyond a simple
rural-urban divide.”
Indeed, this was not the only divide to emerge in the Muslim Brotherhood because, in
time, these policies led not only to the disgruntlement of rural middle-class citizens but
also to the youth who found themselves excluded from the decision making circles.
They were also forced to adopt the “listen and obey” motto of the brotherhood imposed
naturally by the guidance bureau, the highest authority in the pyramidal structure of the
brotherhood. The idea was to enforce organizational discipline among its members but
after the 2011 revolution this led to increasing dissatisfaction followed by organizational
12

splits (Martini et al., 2012). The younger, more tech savvy members, who were naturally
more concentrated in urban cities, saw more opportunity to express their independent
political views. This obviously clashed with the older ruling elite seeking to control and
limit independent thinking.
These differences, rather than being muted, were magnified after June 2013. After an
initial attempt to accommodate younger members, the traditional leadership shifted
course and vied to regain control. The younger members seeing no cause for optimism
in the political situation became more violent-prone. On the other hand, the older
members were more rational and risk averse. They saw that dragging the organization
into violence would risk the future relevance of the organization which managed to
withstand the test of time and endurance since its inception in 1928 (Fahmi, 2015). With
two camps forming, the rebellious camp issued a statement acknowledging the
existence of internal differences. The statement mentioned that:

“some people restricted these differences to the issue of
revolutionism vs. peacefulness but in fact it goes beyond that to
the management and decision-making process and its reference”
(Muntaser, 2015).

This is indeed a recognition not only that there are internal differences over the use of
violence and that some have indeed promulgated using violent means but also that
younger members of the organization feel excluded from the decision making process
and are not consulted beforehand. Today, the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership knows
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the main struggle is not one for power but rather for organizational continuity whose
main pillar is public opinion. This longer term vision, in their opinion needs to avoid
getting dragged into the use of violence which can be used by the state and lead to
adverse domestic consequences for the group all the while increasing international
pressure.
The 1990’s terrorist attacks committed by Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiya and especially
the 1997 attack in Luxor serve as clear historical lessons. The unintended
consequences of these attacks rather than leading to public sympathy for the Islamists
cause led to public outrage against them and harmed the Muslim Brotherhood despite
them not being directly responsible for it.
The urban-rural divide inside the Muslim Brotherhood was clear in the 2012
elections. While urban governorates had the least support for the Muslim Brotherhood’s
candidate, Mohamed Morsi, rural governorates especially those in Upper Egypt had the
highest support for the Islamist candidate. In the first round of the 2012 general
elections, Morsi was able to garner most votes in 13 out of the 27 governorates 6 of
them in rural Upper Egypt. On the other side, in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said Morsi
was only able to garner 17%, 15%, and 15% of the votes respectively, his lowest in the
country.

Conceptual Framework: Terrorism Targeting and Attack
Location
The conceptual framework developed mainly attempts to link between the
existing literature and the Egyptian context. It assumes terrorism targeting strategy
14

could be described by an overall strategic choice in targeting. In this case we also
assume that terrorists attack in the same governorate where they live. The idea behind
it is that the relative cheapness and low impact of most attacks renders the possibility of
far travel outside of one’s governorate obsolete. Just like the example of the young
worker from Shubra who threw a low scale bomb on a bustling Cairo square, one
cannot expect a terrorist to travel great distances unless sophisticated planning and
weaponry was involved.
Throughout the literature, authors have been trying to figure out the causes of terrorism
from an urban and rural dichotomy. However, from a historical Egyptian perspective I
will need to look into another context specific distinction. This is based on Egyptian
geographic and historic realities. Ever since recorded history, Egypt has been divided
by an upper-lower distinction rather than a simple urban-rural one, the latter being only
a relatively modern phenomenon. Not only was Egypt known as “the Two Banks, but
ancient Egyptians also referred to Upper Egypt as “Deshret” meaning the red land
referring to the deserts and Lower Egypt as “Kemet” meaning the black land referring to
its fertility. “The whole [ancient Egyptian] environment”, according to Wilkinson,
“seemed to emphasize that the maintenance of created order relied upon the balance of
opposites: the fertile black land and the arid red land, the east as the realm of the living
and the west as the realm of the dead, the narrow Nile Valley and the broad delta, and
the annual struggle between the chaotic floodwaters and the dry land”. Thus, we try to
combine the modern urban-rural divide with the historic and context specific upper-lower
one.
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In Egypt, urban cities have considerably less Islamist support compared to rural
ones in Upper and Lower Egypt. Following De La Calle & Sanchez Cuence I do expect
to see a negative relation between the level of popular support and terrorist attacks.
Terrorists are less likely to attack in rural areas where popular support for their cause is
already high. As a result, we should expect fewer attacks in rural areas where Muslim
Brotherhood support is higher.

It is also known that urban governorates have a much higher rate of youth
unemployment. These governorates also have a higher rate of unemployed people with
a university degree. This would conform with Grabosky’s (1979) findings of a relation
between the number of unemployed youth and the number of terrorist attacks. These
youth, including those with university degrees are easily susceptible to recruitment by
terrorist groups as they see less opportunity in the job market.
In the Egyptian context, Ian Ross’ “support” variable that leads to more donations and
more weapons should be excluded, as the data indicates the majority of attacks in Nile
basin regions of Egypt are low scale; using devices requiring limited amount of
expertise or sophisticated weaponry. While support, funding, and training are crucial in
case of large scale attacks, small scale ones rely on very limited funds and expertise.
We also witness that Islamist support is higher in Upper Egypt where attacks are
relatively less compared to urban centers.
Comparing Grabosky’s emphasis on the role of middle-class intellectuals in terrorist
organizations with the Egyptian context, we do indeed witness several attacks outside
Egyptian universities targeting police. We also know that the Muslim Brotherhood relies
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in its recruitment mainly on university students and has a large presence there. Thus, as
those students graduate and see little opportunities in the job market we would expect
them to be easily susceptible to the use of violence. Hence, I will use the youth
unemployment measurements per governorate in the model to test Grabosky’s
argument.
The distance between the capital and other cities could also determine why there are
many attacks in Cairo but less so in border governorates such as the Red Sea, Matrouh
or other cities that are far away from the capital such as Luxor and Aswan. Hinkkainen
has tried to prove that the distance between the capital city and an urban area is directly
related to the probability of attacks against civilians. Here, I will test whether such
distance is related to the number of attacks.

Following Crenshaw and Grabosky’s discussion, urban cities witness more attacks than
rural ones because of the multitude of targets. Thus, where there is a larger amount of
legitimate targets I would expect to see more attacks. This would mean that in Egypt,
where terrorists see more “legitimate” targets they are more likely to use this
opportunity. Therefore, I use the number of police stations throughout Egyptian
governorates as a measurement.
The greed and grievance debate presented by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) could also be
helpful in distilling the Egyptian context. Their debate revolved mainly around civil wars,
however such differentiation could also be helpful in cases of terrorism. While it is
known that opportunity in terms of finances or suitable terrain does not apply to the
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Egyptian context outside Sinai we will test whether the grievance model could be
applicable using poverty and unemployment as a measure.
My hypothesis is that urban governorates that have a higher number of educated
unemployed youth as well as a higher number of targets will have higher numbers of
attacks and that there will be a significant correlation between higher rates of
unemployment, whether male educated or male youth, and higher frequency of attacks.
However, to evaluate this hypothesis in light of prevailing theories as discussed above, I
will also test for the impact of other variables such as support base, distance from the
capital, and poverty. Based on that I hypothesize that:

H1: Urban Governorates are more likely to get attacked than rural governorates
Based on the existing literature, if we differentiate between Egyptian governorates
based on an urban-rural distinction we expect to find that urban governorates are more
likely to experience terrorist attacks than rural ones.
H2: Urban Governorates are more likely to get attacked than upper, lower and border
governorates
Seeing that in the Egyptian context there is not only a simple urban-rural divide but also
a geographical distinction, I try to distill whether the traditional geographical approach
could prove more significant.
H3a: The further away the governorate is from the capital the less likely that
governorate is to experience a terrorist attack
18

The literature mentions that one of the reasons why urban cities suffer from more
terrorism is because logistic are easier to acquire in big urban cities than in rural ones.
Thus, the further one gets from the urban center the harder it is to acquire such
logistics. We will try to distill whether the distance between the capital Cairo and a
specific governorate is related to the number of attacks in this governorate.
H3b: Attacks are more likely to occur in the governorate with the capital city.
The literature also mentions that capital cities are more frequently targeted than other
locations. The Cairo governorate has the highest number of attacks overall. Therefore, it
is reasonable to examine if the status of capital is an independent predictor of an
increased number of attacks.
H4: Governorates with higher Islamist support will experience less attacks
Following the literature, public support in a certain city has an inverse relation with the
number of terrorism incidents that occur there. The more votes Islamists get in one
governorate the less terrorist attacks it should witness. Inversely, governorates with low
Morsi votes should have more legitimate targets for terrorism.
H5: Governorates with higher rates of poverty have higher number of attacks
The relationship between poverty and terrorism has proven to get mixed results.
Therefore, it is important to test whether governorates with higher rates of poverty also
have a higher number of attacks.
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H6 (a): Governorates that have higher unemployed males with a university degree will
have more attacks.
According to the literature, many terrorists have a good education and come from
middle-class and well-to-do families. When they see little prospect in the job market
they are more susceptible to joining terrorist organizations. Thus, when there is a high
percentage of people with a university degree that are unable to find a job, more attacks
should occur.
H6 (b): Governorates that have higher rates of male unemployed youth will have more
attacks.
Male unemployed youth are the easiest target for terrorist organizations willing to enlist
more people to their organization. Young people represent the ranks and files of most
terrorist organizations. Being unemployed and male should only increase the likelihood
of having more terrorist attacks.
H7: Governorates that have more police stations will have more attacks
Having more security targets that are considered “legitimate” by terrorists, renders such
cities and governorates more likely to experience terrorist attacks. Attacks on police
targets represent a large percentage of all the attacks and urban Egyptian governorates
do indeed have a larger number of police stations.
The above mentioned hypotheses represent the major theories in the literature
regarding the location of terrorist attacks and the drivers of terrorism. These are also
accommodated to the Egyptian context. Using the data collected to test the hypotheses
20

should give us a better understanding on the causes of terrorism in Egypt and why they
appear concentrated in urban governorates.

Methods
The method used in this project is hypothesis testing using quantitative tests of
significance. The unit of analysis is the governorate. Urban governorates are defined as
those who have more urban than rural population 2. In this section I will present the data
collected, how the hypotheses were operationalized, the tests that were used, and
finally the results of the tests.

Data
In this paper the unit of analysis is governorate, and the dependent variable is
the number of attacks per governorate. Thus, the main dataset is composed of all
incidents of terrorist attacks that have occurred in Egypt, excluding Sinai, within the
period of June 2013 until July 2015. To complete this dataset, I relied mainly on trusted,
local, Arabic news sources such as Al-Masry Al-Youm, Shorouknews, Youm7 or
Vetogate. In some cases, I included events mentioned on social media accounts as
long as a second reference to the incident could be found in established media
sources. Some incidents were also added from the Global Terrorism Database for
years 2013 through 2014.
For each incident, information was collected on the location; city and governorate
level, the date, the target, the weapon used, the fatalities and injuries. Information was
2

More detailed discussion on the reasons for such a definition is provided in the Limitations section.
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also included for known perpetrators, whether the incident was claimed by any known
group, and if it occurred within 14 days of a date of significance.
The next step was to collect the socio-economic data pertaining to each
governorate and their voting patterns. To measure the support base, I relied on the
percentage of Morsi votes in each governorate according to the 2012 presidential
elections. Those were found in several trusted local news websites that reported on the
elections. I chose the percentage of Morsi votes because while there is some debate
over the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the bombings, there is no doubt that such attacks
are at least fueled by some sort of Islamic fundamentalism. In the same time, excluding
Abu Al-Fotouh, Morsi was the leading Islamist leaning candidate and directly supported
by the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, I also relied on the legislative election results
that took place about 6 months before the presidential elections, which ended up
producing an Islamist dominated parliament with the now dissolved Freedom and
Justice Party, the official party of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party
gaining the majority of votes.
Population statistics were drawn from the Central Agency for Public Mobilization
and Statistics (CAPMAS) figures (CAPMAS, 2015a). For the unemployment figures, the
2014 Annual Labor Force Survey report also published by CAPMAS (CAPMAS, 2015b)
was consulted. Again, using the same source I got the latest numbers and percentages
of poverty across governorates (CAPMAS, 2013). In addition, I created indicator
variables for the following factors: urban versus rural, capital city, urban governorate,
upper Egypt, lower Egypt, and border governorates. To create the urban versus rural
variable, I calculated the percentage of population living in cities for each governorate. If
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the percentage was above 60% I coded the governorate as urban, below 60% was
rural. For the regions, I used the designations urban, upper, lower, and border indicated
by CAPMAS. As for the measurement of distance from one specific governorate to the
capital Cairo, I used Google Maps. For the number of police stations I used publicly
available information from online sources.

Descriptive Statistics: An Apparent Urban Focus
Figure 1 shows how urban Egyptian governorates 3 such as Cairo, Giza 4,
Alexandria all rank very high in the number of terrorist attacks. On the other hand,
border governorates 5 like Matrouh, Red Sea, or New Valley experience the least
number of terrorist attacks. Rural governorates in Upper Egypt 6 also rank relatively
lower compared with rural governorates in Lower Egypt 7.
Nevertheless, there are still some questionable figures. Sharqiyah and Beheira,
which are Rural Lower governorates8 have a high amount of terrorist attacks but also
high population figures. In fact, they are ranked in 3rd and 5th position both in terms of

3

Urban governorates include Alexandria, Cairo, Giza, Port Said, Red Sea, Suez, and South Sinai. Cairo and Giza
together form Greater Cairo.

4

Giza has a large rural population. However, for the purpose of this paper we defined urban governorates as ones
where more than 50% of its inhabitants live in urban areas. In some cases, it is considered part of Upper Egypt.
However, its urban characteristics and close proximity to Cairo makes it different from the rest of Upper Egyptian
governorates. Together, Cairo and Giza are sometimes referred to as Greater Cairo.

5

Border governorates include Matrouh, New Valley, North Sinai, Red Sea, and South Sinai. Both Red Sea and
Matrouh are both border governorates and urban governorates. Thus for the purposes of this paper, they will be
classified as urban in the urban-rural divide and border in the regional divide.

Upper Egypt extends from Aswan in the south, Luxor, Qena, Sohag, Assiut, Minya, Beni Suef to Fayoum in the
North
7
Lower Egypt is the delta region of the Nile where the river finally flows to the Mediterranean Sea. It includes,
Beheira, Dakahlia, Damietta, Gharbia, Ismailia, Kafr al-Sheikh, Menoufiya, Qalyubiyah, and Sharqiyah.
8
Both governorates have a big urban population. However, for the purposes of this study I have defined a rural
governorate as having more than 50% rural population. More discussion on this issue is in the Methods and
Limitations sections.
6
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terrorist attacks and population, meaning that the high number of attacks might be
simply attributed to higher population.
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Figure 1 Number of Attacks per Governorate (Excluding Sinai)

In figure 2 we can witness that almost a third of all terrorist attacks in Egypt are
directed against police targets. The rate of police targeting is slightly higher in urban
governorates than in rural ones. However, attacks on transportation infrastructure
(trains, train tracks, buses, etc...) there is a significant difference. While 19% of attacks
in rural governorates target transportation only 10% of urban attacks are on
transportation. In any case, it seems that apart from attacks against transportation there
are only slight differences between both rural and urban attack targets.
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Figure 2 Urban vs. Rural Attack Targets

If we differentiate Egyptian governorates on a regional basis (see Figure 3) we witness
a similar percentage of police targeting, 30% in urban and rural upper governorates.
However, only 25% of attacks in Rural Lower Egypt target the police. There are also
relatively more attacks on transportation in Upper Egypt and more so in Lower Egypt
than in urban governorates. This could be because of great distances these railway
tracks cross and the difficulty to provide total security along these lines. Power and
Service Facilities are also targeted almost twice as much percentagewise both in upper
and lower governorates than in urban ones.
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Nevertheless, these figures show that there is some difference between big urban
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governorates and other Egyptian governorates in terms of the frequency and distribution
of terrorist attacks. However, without further statistical analysis, it is impossible to make
any definite statements about the significance of the descriptive statistics or the
relationship between attacks and different socio-economic or political factors. Therefore,
further investigation is warranted in order to see if the observed trends and patterns
conform to the existing literature on terrorism targeting strategy and the drivers and
causes of terrorism. The next section discusses the selection of empirical tests needed
to test the hypotheses listed above.
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Figure 4 Percentage of Morsi votes in Urban vs. Upper Governorate

Empirical Tests
For the first two hypotheses, the dependent variable is the number of attacks per
governorate. To test for the variance in attack location across governorates, the
independent variable for hypothesis 1 is the urban-rural distinction while for hypothesis
2 it is the regional one.
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Testing the significance of the urban-rural and regional divide in the Nile basin
was best approached with nonparametric tests. The choice to go for these tests was
because the data is not normally distributed (Bhar 2014).
To test the first hypothesis, I used the Mann-Whitney test because of the small sample
size of 25 observations and only two categories; urban and rural. For the second
hypothesis, I used the Kruskall-Wallis test, which is an extension of the Mann-Whitney
test but is used when the independent variable has more than two categories
(Mcdonald, 2008). In this case these are urban, upper, lower, and border governorates.
The independent variables in hypotheses 3-7 are Morsi votes; FJP votes; Nour
Party votes; male youth unemployment; male unemployment with a university degree;
distance from capital; number of police stations; and poverty. An indicator variable was
also created for governorate with capital city in addition to the indicator variable for
urban.
Testing Hypotheses 3-7 an OLS regression would have not been efficient since the data
is mostly count data (Long, 1997). Moreover, since in this case the standard of error is
greater than the mean a negative binomial regression is more appropriate.

Results
First, as indicated in Table 3 population is a significant predictor of an increased
number of attacks. However, the urban-rural divide is statistically insignificant per the
Mann-Whitney test as shown in Table 1, contrary to hypothesis 1. This is also in
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contrast with previous literature which points to an overrepresentation of urban terrorism
targeting compared to rural ones.

Table 1 Mann Whitney Test Results (Urban-Rural divide)

The difference between urban, rural upper, rural lower, and border governorates
is statistically significant as presented in Table 2. Although the Kruskall-Wallis test
shows this, on the basis of the negative binomial regression, being an urban
governorate does not predict a higher number of attacks when controlling for population.
In addition, being the urban governorate with the capital is also not significant when
controlling for population. When distance to the capital was introduced into the model, it
became significant consistent with hypothesis 3. This relationship remained significant
and negative, as indicated in Model 6, when population was added to the model.
However, when support base variables and unemployment were added to the model it
became insignificant. Again, as shown in Model 1, the percentage of votes for
Mohamed Morsi in the first round of the 2012 presidential election was not significant,
although the coefficient sign was negative.
29

Nevertheless, since Mohamed Morsi votes in the 2012 elections might not have
been the best representation of Islamist support, I included other indicators. Therefore,
as shown in Table 3, I used the percentage of votes for the Freedom and Justice Party,
and the Nour Party as indicators of Islamist support. These variables are significant, but
the coefficient sign is positive predicting an increase in attack frequency in contradiction
to hypothesis 4.

Table 2 Kruskal Wallis Test Results (Regional Divide)

The next set of models included variables for socio-economic grievances.
Poverty, as expected, was not significant. This is compatible with Krueger’s (2008)
exclusion of poverty as a causal variable of terrorism. In addition, Grabosky’s (1979)
argument of a relation between youth unemployment and terrorism is also supported.
As presented in Model 9, the percentage of males with a university degree was a
significant predictor of increased attacks at the 1% level as was the percentage of male
youth who are unemployed as shown in Model 8. Overall, unemployment variables
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seem to vary depending on the other included variables. When introducing the Capital
governorate in Model 10, unemployment ceased to be significant.
The number of police targets was statistically significant at 1% without controlling for
population. However, once population was introduced into the model police targets
became insignificant meaning that the number of police stations is only a function of
population. Of all the variables, the only one that was significant at the 1% level and
positive across all models was support for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and
Justice Party.
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Table 3 What affects the frequency and distribution of attacks across Egyptian governorates

Discussion
According to the abovementioned results there are several issues that stand out.
First is the distinction between the governorates based on their type. While there was a
visible difference between urban and rural governorates, such a distinction proved to be
insignificant. The other distinction combining the urban-rural divide with the Egyptianspecific geographical and historical divide proved its significance. This means that the
traditional urban-rural divide presented by the literature should not be taken at its face
value. Rather, counter-terrorists as well as counter-insurgents should combine these
theories with context specific solutions as they can ill afford to experience firsthand the
dangers of not adapting theory to practice. For our case, combining the urban-rural
distinction provided by the literature with the context specific one of an upper-lower
distinction demonstrates the importance of such adaptation.
Second is the clear correlation between population numbers and terrorist attacks.
Governorates with higher population experience more attacks. This explains why it
appeared at first that urban governorates experience more attacks than rural ones.
Rather, the results show that the main reason for this preconception was because urban
governorates have the highest population. Cairo and Giza are the two most populated
governorates and the ones most frequently attacked. Sharqiyah and Beheira, rural
governorates with high population figures also experience higher frequency of attacks.
Meanwhile, border governorates that are sparsely populated have the least amount of
attacks. One possible reason is the wider recruitment pool available for terrorist
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organizations in more populous areas. Another reason could be the anonymity factor.
The latter could be a function of population rather than depending on the type of
governorate. Terrorists are more likely to commit terrorism if they believe they are more
likely to get away with it no matter in which type of setting they live.
Third, there are also several variables that had varying degrees of significance
including distance to capital and police stations. The former, as I mentioned was
significant alone at 1% but once controlling for population it became significant only at
5% and after including other variables it ceased to be significant. This means that
population still plays some role, especially since the sheer number of attacks happen in
the higher populated Nile Delta which is close to the capital compared to Upper Egypt
which is less populated and further away. In any case, the significance of distance might
not be necessarily because of logistical factors. In fact, logistical factors should matter
less in this case since most materials used in the attacks are low scale that require
limited sophisticated weaponry that could be found in rural as in urban settings.
On the other side, the number of police stations seemed not to have an effect once
controlling for population. This means that governorates with more police targets are
attacked more frequently only because there is a higher amount of people living in this
certain area and not because the multitude of targets make it more attractive for
terrorists.
Fourth is the issue of socio-economic grievances and their relation to terrorism.
The results show that not all socio-economic grievances cause terrorism. These results
conform in some way to Collier and Hoeffler’s assumption of the insignificance of
grievance. Poverty, for example, had no relation to terrorism. Just like “war is politics
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with other means” (Clausewitz, 1832), terrorism is politics with other means not
economics. Terrorism is the weapon of those who have a political agenda. Those with
economic grievances seldom pursue terrorism but rather peaceful means or in extreme
cases crime. Since the definition of terrorism, divided as it is, naturally excludes acts of
violence that are committed for pure material gains, it should not come as a surprise
that poverty does not cause terrorism.
This is not to say that unemployed educated youth do not have socio-economic
grievances. But rather that their grievances could succumb to the political arena more
easily. Terrorist organizations are thus able to mobilize these grievances in their favor to
the use of violence. On the other hand, poor people tend to accept their socio-economic
status as a natural fact and seldom blame the underlying political conditions. However,
even if they do they rarely act upon it through the use of political violence.
Fifth, and most importantly, is the significant and positive correlation between
Muslim Brotherhood support and terrorist attacks. This relation stands in contrast to the
literature which mentions that terrorist organizations attack less frequently in places
where they have higher levels of support in order not to alienate their own support base.
For this case it seems that terrorist organizations have no problem with attacking their
own support base as long as they do not lead to direct casualties. This result means
that the literature need not focus only on the sheer number or frequency of attacks but
rather the kind and lethality of the attacks.
In cases where terrorists are more inclined to target civilians or at least are less casualty
sensitive they might indeed prefer to attack in places with low support just like the
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Chechen rebels choose to attack Russian civilians but focus on Russian military targets
inside Chechenia (Reuter, 2004).
In any case, the avoidance of civilian casualties is a conscious strategic decision.
One of the possible reasons behind that is because for them ‘terrorism’, as Brian
Jenkins (1974) defended terrorist’s sanity, ‘is theater’. Terrorists want a lot of people
watching not a lot of people dead (Jenkins, 1975). The avoidance of civilian casualties
is among other reasons designed to showcase inability rather than extract maximum
damage.
Another puzzle is what precipitated the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn to violence.
Indeed, one possible reason is the organizational split that occurred in the Brotherhood
post June 2013. Following Ian Ross’ (2013) argument, the split inside the Muslim
Brotherhood acted as a direct precipitant of the organization’s turn to terrorism. Several
small groups that were formed after 2013 like the Popular Resistance Movement
(PRM), promulgated a similar balance between nationalistic and Islamist ideologues to
the MB. Their statements and videos suggest it was formed by disaffected brotherhood
youth (TIMEP, 2015). Nevertheless, they did not shy away from attacking the Muslim
Brotherhood’s position and its “recumbence under the guise of peacefulness” (PRM,
2016).
For counter-terrorism policies it is important to mention one caveat regarding
organizational splits. On a practical level, orchestrating and motivating organizational
splits of radical and terrorist organizations might not necessarily lead to the demise of
such groups. Rather such splits might be counter-conducive and lead to more terrorism
rather than less.
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Another question is why support for the Muslim Brotherhood is more significant than
Morsi votes. The 2012 parliamentary elections saw the Muslim Brotherhood get the
majority of votes, higher than Morsi votes a few months later. MB voters were not only
the organization’s members but also those who indirectly support it or sympathize with
them and believe they should be finally given some chance. In the subsequent
presidential elections, this support decreased and the MB nominee was not able to get
the same amount of votes. One possible theory behind the higher significance of MB
votes is that terrorism relies on a more loose definition of support base rather than a
direct and limited one. In August 2014, PRM issued a statement claiming 19 attacks
itself in addition to tens of other attacks that were accredited to other groups not
formally part of PRM. This lends more support to the loose definition of support base
theory. Formal organizations are able to mobilize direct support in their favor while other
loosely affiliated groups or individuals are able to use the anonymity to commit their own
attacks.
This could mean that the Muslim Brotherhood was either able to mobilize their
traditional support base for terrorist attacks or that individual sympathizers are able to
use the relative anonymity this support base provides in their attacks without formal
involvement from the organization. There is still a high degree of coherence in the
strategy and lethality of the attacks, making the idea of total organizational
uninvolvement difficult. Despite appearing random in nature, these attacks follow a
largely similar pattern of attack lethality and target selectivity meaning that there are at
least some kind of general guidelines that are consistent across governorates.
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However, the frequency of their execution relies more on the support base in that
governorate and possibly the anonymity this support base provides.
A third puzzle is why MB support is more significant than the different
unemployment figures. Youth unemployment could be a good opportunity for terrorist
organizations seeking to recruit more people into their ranks but MB support still seems
a greater predictor of terrorist attacks. One explanation is that the Muslim Brotherhood’s
support base is the main tool through which the organization relies in its terrorist activity
while youth unemployment is a secondary factor on which they rely.
Keeping this in mind, it is now vital to know how to act upon this information on a
practical level. In the subsequent section I provide several recommendations on how to
deal with domestic terrorism in Egypt and enhance counter-terrorism efforts.

Limitations
There are still some limitations to the methodology that have to be taken into
account when looking at the results and analyzing them. First, I faced the problem of
defining an urban and rural governorate and where to draw the line between them.
While there are clear examples like Cairo, Port Said, or Suez that have no rural
population, all other governorates -including rural governorates- have both an urban and
rural population. Therefore, I decided to draw the line at the 50% mark. This means that
while terrorist attacks in some cases occur in urban areas of mostly rural governorates,
the attack is still considered a rural attack. One solution could have been to change the
unit of analysis to a more local level. However, this would have also required more
detailed socio-economic data and elections results that are not publicly available.
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This caveat means that this definition of urban-rural divide does not necessarily
conform to the one presented by literature. Localizing the unit of analysis might have
indeed resulted in an over-representation of urban attacks as mentioned by the
literature, but this could have compromised the quantitative ability to measure the real
causes of terrorism. If a person has the ability to travel outside of his local village to
conduct an attack, which he does, then we would not be able to measure the effect of
socio-economic or other variables in his own home-area. As mentioned, the low scale
nature of the attacks also makes far travel obsolete. Thus, choosing the governorate
level as the unit of analysis was the better alternative.
Another limitation was the reliability of socio-economic variables. For the
unemployment data, CAPMAS relies on samples that might not be statistically
representative of the overall unemployment figures. In any case, in the absence of
better data on unemployment, CAPMAS provides the most reliable source on such
socio-economic data.

Recommendations
Given the relative overall coherence in the attacks, it is clear that there is some
kind of guiding strategy. Despite appearing random in nature, these attacks follow a
coherent strategic line. Thus, the first step of a successful counter-strategy is to
understand what drives such attacks and what does not. Of vital importance to such a
counter-terrorism strategy would be to customize it to Egypt’s situation. The difference
between urban governorates, rural lower, rural upper, and border governorates has to
38

be taken into consideration with variations depending on the terrain and other
independent variables.
The Egyptian government’s plan calls for early detection of terrorist organizations
and drying up of their resources. It also vies to focus on the development of border
governorates, improve their services and launch investments. While this is an essential
step towards tackling the insurgency in Sinai, this vision has to be adapted to the other
three types of governorates namely urban, Lower, and Upper Egyptian governorates.
Hence, it is important to customize counter-terrorism strategies to the different types of
governorates.
Police targets in urban governorates have to be hardened. This could include
close camera monitoring designed to deter as a first line of defence and counter-attack
in more extreme cases. Rural governorates on the other hand need a more populationcentric approach especially in Upper Egypt where Islamist organizations based their
popularity on social services. Rather than capture terrorists responsible for attacks on
train tracks, for example, it would be easier and more beneficial to increase the
efficiency and quality of the railway system. Other government provided services that
are possible targets such as power or sewage systems have to be enhanced rather
than hardened, the latter being an impossible achievement. With the number of easy
‘legitimate’ targets decreasing and grievance-related targets enhanced, terrorism
operations will be harder to execute and more susceptible to public scrutiny.

The issue of unemployment with special emphasis on youth unemployment has
to be securitized. Job creation should be looked upon not only from a socio-economic
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viewpoint but from a political one that aims to limit radical organizations’ attempts to
penetrate and use these grievances for terrorist activity.

Most importantly, any counter-terrorism strategy has to include measures to deal
with the Muslim Brotherhood and the support it receives. If terrorist groups are
constrained by the preferences of their support base, then a successful strategy has to
widen the latter’s margin of sensitivity from one narrowly focused on civilian casualties
to one sensitive to other kinds of attacks. A ripple effect could occur when the shrinking
support base makes the group relatively more radical and violent which in turn leaves
the group with less support. This cycle will ultimately lead to the demise of the group
which is exactly what worries the older MB traditional leaders.

Further Studies
There are several questions that this paper presents for further research and
study, most notably the relation between Islamic extremism and terrorism. The ongoing
and rapidly changing events inside the Muslim Brotherhood itself will mean that the
broader issue of political Islamism and its relation to political violence and terrorism
must receive greater scrutiny. Future studies related to the Muslim Brotherhood should
focus on where the organization is entrenched, the reasons behind its support, and
most importantly to which extent this support could be mobilized either into politically
peaceful activity or terrorist activity. It is also vital to have more investigative research
on the internal structure and decision making within the Muslim Brotherhood and to
which extent the clash between the younger, more tech savvy members and the old
guard has translated on the ground in terms of public support.
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On an academic level, organizational splits of terrorist organizations should also
be studied further in terms of whether such splits could decrease the overall
cohesiveness of the group or if it rather increases the chances of terrorist attacks. This
paper has provided a contrast to the existing literature in terms the selectivity of targets.
However, the terrorism literature needs more research the relation between the support
base and lethality of terrorist attacks as well as selectivity of targets. Another issue to be
looked at is the anonymity factor. Does the ability to stay anonymous act as a
permissive factor causing terrorism? This would have to include different methodologies
than the purely quantitative one used in this paper.
This paper has been an exploration of the dynamics of terrorism in Egypt since
2013. It suggests that there is some relation between Muslim Brotherhood support and
terrorist attacks in Egypt and that this is probably related to educated unemployed
males. Further research on this matter could yield more precise results.
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